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Abstract
This Article unfolds as follows: Section I looks at the “pervasive effect” of European Union
(”EU”) law upon the substantive law of the Member States. Instead of attempting to cover all cases
where this effect has arisen, a selective but in-depth approach is preferred. In this regard, four areas
falling within the competences of the Member States will be discussed, namely education, family
law, direct taxation, and health care. Section II is devoted to the pervasive effects of EU law upon
national rules of procedure. Taking four cases as examples, this Section sets out to demonstrate
that the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”) takes into account the general procedural principles
enshrined in national law when applying the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Finally,







FEDERALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: 





“I do not think [the case law shows] that the Court has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or has adopted a federalist approach contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaty itself. It seems to me that the Court has 
sought to do what the Treaty required it to do. I certainly never saw 
myself as one of a unanimous group of committed federalists 
conspiring to push federation beyond the limits laid down by the 
Treaty. If we had been such, a great deal of the hard-headed 
discussion in thrashing out judgments within the framework of the 
Treaty could have been avoided. Instead we sought to decide in 
accordance with the Treaty and the object and purpose of the 
legislation.” 
—Lord Slynn of Hadley1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article honors the late Lord Slynn in that it confirms 
the above statement through an examination of federalism and 
the rule of law in the work of the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ” or “Court”). A classical approach might suggest 
examining the role that the Court has had in monitoring the 
legislative competences of the European Union (“EU”), or in 
setting a common standard of protection of fundamental rights2 
 
*  Judge and President of Chamber at the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
and Professor of European Union Law K.U. Leuven, he holds a lic. iuris, PhD in Law 
(K.U. Leuven), LL.M. (Harvard University) and M.P.A. (Harvard University). All 
opinions expressed herein are personal to the Author. 
1. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Critics of the Court: A Reconsideration, in EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW IN THE ENGLISH COURTS 3–11 (Mads Andenas & Francis Jacobs eds., 
1998). 
2. See Piet Eeckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 
39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 945, 945 (2002). 
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under the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) and, where appropriate, under the new Treaty on 
European Union (“EU Treaty”).3 Without neglecting the 
constitutional importance of the case law relating to these 
matters,4 the purpose here is to explore federalism in a broader 
context, in particular, by looking at the way in which EU law 
imposes negative limits upon the powers retained by the Member 
States, i.e., the “pervasive effects of federalism.” 
Federalism, understood as the balance of power between the 
federation and its component entities,5 cannot be reduced to the 
principle of conferral alone. The reason is twofold. On the one 
hand, federalism operates in areas of law that indisputably fall 
within the competence of the EU. In addition to drawing the 
borderline between EU and national competence, federalism 
defines the relationship between the two levels of governance 
when they occupy the same policy field. For instance, when 
measuring the degree of discretion left to the Member States by a 
directive, the ECJ simultaneously decides whether to allocate 
powers to the EU or to the Member States.6 Likewise, when 
 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon (“Reform Treaty”) entered into force on December 1, 
2009. See The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 (entered into force 
Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Reform Treaty]. The Reform Treaty modifies the Treaty on 
European Union (“EU Treaty”) and replaces the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (“EC Treaty”) by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). References to articles of the new EU Treaty will be followed by the acronym 
“TEU post-Lisbon,” and references to articles of the TFEU will be followed by the 
acronym “TFEU.” All references to the new EU Treaty and to the TFEU must be 
understood as references to their consolidated versions. See Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 
O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
4. See, e.g., Germany v. Parliament, Case C-380/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-11573; The 
Queen, ex rel. Alliance for Natural Health v. Sec’y of State for Health, Joined Cases C-154 
& C-155/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-6451; The Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec’y of State 
for Health, Case C-210/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-11893; Arnold André GmbH & Co. v. 
Landrat des Kreises Herford, Case C-434/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-11825; The Queen v. Sec’y 
of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., Case C-
491/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-11,453; Germany v. Parliament, Case C-376/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
8419. 
5. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 205, 205 (1990). 
6. See The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas 
Ireland Ltd., Case C-5/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 28 (holding that Council Directive 
No. 74/577, O.J. L 316/10 (1974) (on stunning of animals before slaughter) precluded 
the United Kingdom from invoking article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC) to impose a ban on 
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examining whether national law conflicts with EU law, the ECJ is, 
at the same time, deciding whether to limit the regulatory 
capacities of the Member States.7 
On the other hand, federalism also takes place beyond the 
bounds laid down by article 5 TEU (“Treaty on European 
Union”) post-Lisbon (article 5 EC (“Treaty Establishing the 
European Community”)).8 At first sight, this statement may seem 
far-fetched. Yet, no one would dispute that once there is a cross-
border element or link that triggers the application of the 
substantive law of the EU, no area of national law—not even 
areas traditionally reserved to the Member States—remains a 
“safe haven.” In this regard, it will be argued that this “pervasive 
effect” of federalism has two consequences. First, it compels 
Member States to “think federal.” When passing legislation, for 
example, Member States must take into account any possible 
nexus with EU law. Unless the application of a measure is 
reserved to purely internal situations, Member States are to place 
their policies in an EU law framework. Compliance with EU law 
may then force national or regional legislators to regulate aspects 
 
exports of animals to Spain). Since the interests the British authorities sought to protect 
were already safeguarded by the directive, and given that they failed to prove that 
Spanish slaughterhouses were in breach of the directive, the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) ruled that the United Kingdom had overstepped the margin of discretion 
allowed by the EU legislator. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. More recently, the Court observed that 
Council Directive No. 80/987, O.J. L 283/23 (1980) (on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the 
insolvency of their employer), only compelled the Member States to adopt measures 
protecting the accrued pension rights of employees in the event of the insolvency of 
their employer. The Member States were not required to guarantee these rights with 
public funding. Nor was there an obligation to set up a system funding these rights in 
full. Yet, the ECJ considered that a national system that may occasionally lead to a 
reduction of eighty percent in entitlement benefits did not comply with article 8 of the 
directive. Clearly, such reduction would render the objectives laid down in the directive 
devoid of purpose. See Robins v. Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-278/05, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-1053, ¶ 69. 
7. See generally KOEN LENAERTS, LE JUGE ET LA CONSTITUTION AUX ÉTATS-UNIS 
D’AMERIQUE ET DANS L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE EUROPEEN (1988); Eugene D. Cross, Pre-
Emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis, 
29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447 (1992); Robert Schütze, Supremacy without Pre-Emption? 
The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-Emption, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
1023 (2006); Stephen Weatherill, Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and Constitutional 
Change in the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 13–33 
(David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994). 
8. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 5, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 18; EC Treaty, supra note 
3, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 46. 
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of family law, property law, education, public health, or direct 
taxation in ways that do not necessarily reflect the first choice of 
their constituency. Second, the application of EU law to areas 
traditionally reserved to the Member States may produce a 
spillover effect.9 Since the “pervasiveness” of EU law only applies 
to cross-border situations, purely internal situations are not 
affected.10 EU law allows national or regional legislators to 
discriminate against non-movers.11 Yet, it is very unlikely for 
reverse discrimination to be left unaddressed.12 Since non-movers 
tend to be nationals, they have access to the national or regional 
political process to claim the extension of EU rights to all 
citizens.13 Alternatively, the national judiciary may decide to rely 
on the national constitution—the principle of equality—to 
improve the rights of non-movers.14 Moreover, the “pervasive 
 
9. The “spillover” effect of EU law may be defined as the application by national 
authorities of EU norms (e.g., rules, principles, concepts) to situations governed entirely 
and exclusively by national law. Obviously, this effect is not mandated by EU law but 
takes place either because of a policy choice (national authorities consider that the 
solution adopted by the EU is a positive development that should be emulated) or 
because national law prohibits to treat purely internal situations less favorably than cross-
border situations (reverse discrimination). See Christiaan Timmermans, The European 
Union’s Judicial System, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 393, 401 (2004) (referring to the 
“spillover” effect of EU law as “a phenomenon of legal osmosis”). 
10. See, e.g., Jacquet & Uecker v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Joined Cases C-64 & C-
65/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-3171; Ministère Public v. Mathot, Case 98/86, [1987] E.C.R. 809, 
¶¶ 8–9; Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, Case 286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575, ¶ 9; 
Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Case 115/78, [1979] E.C.R. 399; 
Ministère Public v. Auer, Case 136/78, [1979] E.C.R. 437; The Queen v. Saunders, Case 
175/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1129; see also Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and 
the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?, [2002] 39 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 731. 
11. See Timmermans, supra note 9, at 393–405. 
12. In matters falling within the competence of the EU, a possible solution putting 
an end to reverse discrimination would be harmonization. However, this solution is not 
possible where the EU lacks legislative powers. Therefore, the situation would have to be 
addressed internally or by means of horizontal cooperation between the Member States 
(e.g., international treaty). 
13. See Dzodzi v. Belgium, Joined Cases C-297/88 & C-197/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-
3763, ¶ 4 (where Belgian law provided that the spouse of a Belgian citizen shall be 
treated as an EU citizen, rendering the rights granted by EU law applicable to purely 
internal situations). 
14. See Timmermans, supra note 9, at 400 (indicating that the Hoge Raad may have 
been inclined to follow the case law of the ECJ relating to the principle of 
proportionality and state liability in internal situations); see also R. (Alconbury Devs. 
Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp., & the Regions, [2001] UKHL 23, at [51], 
[2003] 2 A.C. 295, 320–21 (2001) (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (where Lord Slynn 
posited that “the time has come to recognize that [the EU principle of proportionality] 
is part of English administrative law, not only when judges are dealing with [EU] acts but 
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effect” of EU law affects not only the substance of national law, 
but also its rules of procedure. Even if the EU is committed to 
respecting the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness15 impose a minimum 
threshold of judicial protection. Like the substance of national 
law, national rules of procedure may also be modified whenever 
the ECJ considers that EU rights are not adequately safeguarded. 
This means that the impetus to “think federal” and the 
“spillover” effect of EU law are reproduced in the context of 
national procedural law. When adopting rules of procedure, 
national legislators must take into account whether they satisfy 
EU standards of judicial protection. Likewise, the “spillover” 
effect of EU law has been especially important in relation to the 
law of remedies.16 
This Article unfolds as follows: Section I looks at the 
“pervasive effect” of EU law upon the substantive law of the 
Member States. Instead of attempting to cover all cases where 
this effect has arisen, a selective but in-depth approach is 
preferred. In this regard, four areas falling within the 
competences of the Member States will be discussed, namely 
education, family law, direct taxation, and health care. Section II 
is devoted to the pervasive effects of EU law upon national rules 
of procedure. Taking four cases as examples, this section sets out 
to demonstrate that the ECJ takes into account the general 
procedural principles enshrined in national law when applying 
 
also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the 
Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be 
unnecessary and confusing.”); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 141 
(2006) (stating that the principle of proportionality has “percolated through English 
administrative law”). See also the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, ruling 
that reverse discrimination would breach the principle of equality as provided by the 
Italian Constitution. Corte cost., 30 dec. 1997, n.443, Giur. It. 1998, III, 3, 2093, Foro It., 
1998, I, 1, 701. In support of national courts stepping in, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse 
Discrimination, in THE FUTURE OF REMEDIES IN EUROPE 117–40 (Kilpatrick et al. eds., 
2000). 
15. See, e.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, ¶¶ 2–3 (discussing equivalent effects); Comet BV v. 
Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, ¶¶ 3–5 (prohibiting 
Member States from passing laws which effectively overturned EU law). 
16. See M v. Home Office, [1994] 1 A.C. 377 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(extending the effect of The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame 
Ltd., Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2433, so as to allow “injunctions against the Crown” 
in purely internal situations). 
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the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Finally, Section 
III provides a brief conclusion. 
I. FRAMING THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE MEMBER 
STATES 
Substantive law falling within the competences of the 
Member States may be framed by the treaty provisions on non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality, free movement, EU 
citizenship, and competition law applicable to the Member 
States. Regardless of the substantive area of national law involved, 
these treaty provisions operate as limits to the exercise of the 
regulatory and taxing powers of the Member States. For instance, 
the ECJ has tested the compatibility with these treaty provisions 
of national measures adopted in the fields of criminal law,17 
education,18 family law,19 public health,20 social security,21 and 
direct taxation.22 Consequently, in order to determine whether 
Member States duly operate within an EU law framework, it is 
necessary to assess the scope of application of the TFEU. 
In addition to the specific conditions of application for each 
of these treaty provisions, a common feature shared by all is that 
 
17. See, e.g., Geffroy & Casino France SNC, Case C-366/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-6579; 
Calfa, Case C-348/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-11. 
18. See, e.g., Commission v. Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5969; 
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-65/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-6427; Gravier v. City of Liège, 
Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593. 
19. See, e.g., Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-
7639; Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613; Konstantinidis v. 
Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191. 
20. See, e.g., The Queen ex rel. Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, 
[2006] E.C.R. I-4325; Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ 
Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509; B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms), Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473; 
Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931; Decker v. 
Caisses de Maladie des Employés Privés, Case C-120/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831. 
21. See, e.g., Geven v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen, Case C-213/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-
6347; Hartmann v. Bayern, Case C-212/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-6303; Meints v. Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Case C-57/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-6689; Lepore v. Office National 
des Pensions, Joined Cases C-45–46/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6497; Paraschi v. 
Landesversicherungsanstalt Wurttemberg, Case C-349/87, [1991] E.C.R. I-4501. 
22. See, e.g., Finanzamt Dinslaken v. Meindl, Case C-329/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-1107; 
Commission v. Sweden, Case C-104/06, [2007] E.C.R. I-671; Marks v. Halsey, Case C-
446/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10,837; Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-225; Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, Case C-80/94, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-2493. 
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there must be a link or nexus with EU law. No link exists where 
the situation at issue is purely internal (or does not have an EU 
dimension, in the case of competition law). Accordingly, in the 
absence of a link, EU law cannot display its pervasive effect. 
Situations that remain purely internal (without an EU 
dimension) are thus entirely governed by national law. As 
recognized by the ECJ, reverse discrimination is then permitted. 
A Member State may discriminate against persons not benefiting 
from the protection of EU law. 
It has been argued that this link is no less than the 
reformulation of the principle of conferral for the judicial 
enforcement of treaty limits imposed upon the Member States. 
Others have argued that it enshrines the principle of 
subsidiarity.23 Be that as it may, the truth is that determining the 
presence or the absence of a link with EU law has significant 
repercussions on the vertical allocation of powers. 
The laxer the way the link with EU law is interpreted, the 
wider the EU law framework becomes, and the fewer situations 
where reverse discrimination may arise. From a federal 
perspective, a broad link with EU law would significantly restrict 
the exercise of competences pertaining to the Member States.24 
On the contrary, a strict interpretation would leave more room to 
the national legislator.  
The case law relating to free movement and EU citizenship 
indicates that the ECJ has opted for a rather broad interpretation 
of the required EU link. This has been done in different ways. 
Thus, the ECJ has applied EU law to situations where barriers are 
erected to insulate a territory from other parts of the same 
 
23. The principle of subsidiarity is defined in article 5(3) TEU post-Lisbon. This 
treaty provision states: 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. 
TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 5(3), 2010 O.J. C 83/13, at 18; see also Peter Oliver, 
Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28–30 (ex 30–36) EC, [1999] 36 Common 
Mkt. L. Rev. 783, 784 (arguing that “[t]he draftsmen of the Treaty plainly took the view 
that it is no business of the [EU] to prevent Member States from imposing restrictions 
on trade in goods and services within their own territory. To use terminology which is 
more fashionable in some quarters, it is a question of subsidiarity.”). 
24. See SÍOFRA O’LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP: 
FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP 276 (1996). 
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Member State.25 It has also adopted a relaxed approach when 
examining whether a contested national measure had a deterrent 
effect on the exercise of EU rights.26 Likewise, EU law applies 
when free movers return to their own Member State.27 
Furthermore, it is possible for a party to invoke the EU rights of a 
third party, insofar as there is a “direct link” between the legal 
position of the first party and the rights of the third party.28 
Concerning the application of the treaty provisions on EU 
citizenship, it is sufficient that a national of a Member State 
lawfully resides (or has resided) in a Member State other than 
that of his or her nationality.29 
Finally, far from being rigid and immovable, the EU law 
framework has “shifting contours.” This is due to the fact that, 
even if there is in principle a breach of EU law, Member States 
can still invoke reasons of general interest recognized by the EU 
to justify their actions. Therefore, provided that the Member 
State concerned relies on one of these reasons and complies with 
the principle of proportionality, the national action will be 
upheld.30 Ultimately, it is thus for the ECJ, as interpreter of the 
 
25. See, e.g., Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-4139; Pistre, Barthes, Milhau & Oberti, Joined Cases C-321–24/94, [1997] 
E.C.R. I-2343; Lancry v. Direction Générale des Douanes, Joined Cases C-363, 407–
11/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-3957. More recently, see Gouvernment de la Communauté 
Française v. Gouvernement Flamand, Case C-212/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1683. 
26. See Jia v. Migrationsverket, Case C-1/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-1; Carpenter v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279. 
27. See De Cuyper v. Office National de l’Emploi, Case C-406/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-
6947, ¶¶ 37–47; Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad, 
Case C-192/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451, ¶¶ 24–34. 
28. See Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, 
¶¶ 17–21. 
29. See Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
9925, ¶ 45. When the treaty provisions on EU citizenship apply, they can be relied 
against the Member State whose nationality the EU citizen possesses. See Grunkin-Paul v. 
Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, ¶ 21; Turpeinen, Case C-
520/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,685, ¶ 18; D’Hoop v. Office National de l’Emploi, Case C-
224/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-6191, ¶ 40. 
30. When applying this principle to restrictions on the fundamental freedoms or 
EU citizenship rights, the ECJ has often applied the “least restrictive alternative” test. 
However, the application of this test is not mechanical. Due to its open-textured nature, 
the principle of proportionality is highly influenced by the legal and factual context in 
which it is applied. It is an area where casuistry largely controls. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 
14, at 214–18; see also CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU 112–13, 
243–44 (2004). For a recent example where the ECJ appears to depart from the “least 
restrictive alternative” to respect fully Member State responsibility for road safety, see 
Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. In the same vein, for the social 
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TFEU, to evaluate through the medium of balancing whether the 
competences retained by the Member States have been 
consistently exercised in an EU law framework. 
Let us now turn to illustrating this line of analysis with some 
cases involving national law on access to higher or university 
education, the giving of surnames, the mobility of same-sex 
married couples, direct taxation, and patient mobility. 
A. Education: Access to Higher or University Education 
Articles 165 and 166 TFEU (articles 149 and 150 EC) 
provide that it is for the Member States to set up the contents of, 
and to organize, education and vocational training.31 
Accordingly, a Member State may decide either to require 
candidates wishing to pursue university studies to pass an entry 
examination or to grant free access upon completion of 
secondary studies. Each policy pursues a legitimate aim. While 
the former tries to make sure that there are sufficient places and 
resources available for the best students, the latter aims to reduce 
social differences by giving the same opportunities to all students. 
Obviously, the latter policy is only sustainable insofar as the 
education system can cope with the demand for specific courses. 
If the number of applicants is too high, then the national 
authorities would certainly be forced to redefine their policy, 
establishing a maximum number of students per course (a system 
of numerus clausus). 
However, the fluctuations in demand are not conditioned by 
national students or students residing in a Member State alone, 
but also by European students wishing to study outside their 
home country. Indeed, ever since Gravier v. City of Liège,32 the ECJ 
has consistently held that free movement law covers access to 
vocational training, understood as both higher and university 
education. Accordingly, even if the Member States remain 
competent to regulate access to higher and university education, 
 
protection of victims of road traffic accidents, see Commission v. Italy, Case C-518/06, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-3491. For public health, see Commission v. Italy, Case C-531/06, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-4103, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes v. Saarland, Joined Cases C-171–
72/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-4171. 
31. TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 165–66, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 47; EC Treaty, supra note 3, 
arts. 149–50, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 112–13. 
32. Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593. 
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their policy choices are limited by free movement law. For 
instance, students having completed secondary studies in France 
and failing to pass the national entry examination may wish to 
move to Belgium where access is easier. Due to the difference in 
size of both countries,33 the impact of free movement upon the 
Belgian education system could be rather large. However, even if 
there was a flood of EU students deciding to study in Belgium, 
this Member State could, as a matter of principle, not deny access 
to higher or university education on a discriminatory basis. If 
there is free access for all students holding a Belgian secondary 
education degree, then access has to be granted to all EU 
students holding comparable qualifications.  
In Commission v. Belgium (the certificat d’enseignement 
secondaire supérieur (“CESS”) case) decided in 2004,34 faced with 
such a factual scenario, the Court ruled that by submitting 
holders of secondary education diplomas awarded in other 
Member States to additional entry requirements, while not doing 
so for holders of the Belgian CESS, Belgium had breached article 
18 TFEU (article 12 EC).35 One year later, in Commission v. 
Austria,36 the Court repeated that by imposing additional entry 
requirements to holders of secondary education diplomas 
awarded in a Member State other than Austria, this Member 
State had breached article 18 TFEU (article 12 EC). As opposed 
to Belgium, which provided no justification, Austria justified its 
legislation by (1) the existence and homogeneity of its higher or 
university education system, (2) the prevention of the abuse of 
EU law and (3) the honoring of a previous international 
agreement. In relation to the first justification, Austria argued 
that if students who completed their secondary studies in a 
Member State other than Austria, and failed to pass the national 
entry examination therein, were given automatic access to 
Austrian universities, then the system would be put under 
enormous financial and structural pressure.37 However, the ECJ 
 
33. France had about 64 million inhabitants as of about 2008, whereas Belgium has 
about 4.2 million French speaking citizens. See France Prioux, Recent Demographic 
Developments in France: Expectancy Still Rising, 63 POPULATION 375, 375 (English ed., 
2008); CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2010 68 (2009). 
34. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-65/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-6427. 
35. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. 
36. Commission v. Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5969. 
37. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. 
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held that there were other less restrictive means to counter the 
excessive demand for specific courses, such as establishing an 
entry examination or setting minimum grade requirements.38 By 
not proving that the system would collapse unless the 
discriminatory legislation remained in force, Austria’s 
justification did not comply with the principle of 
proportionality.39 As to the second justification, Austria argued 
that its law sought to prevent Austrian students from abusing EU 
law.40 Nonetheless, the Court recalled empathically that far from 
being an abuse, the possibility for a student of the EU who 
studied outside Austria to be treated equally amounted to “the 
very essence of the principle of free movement for students 
guaranteed by the Treaty.”41 Finally, regarding the last 
justification, the Court ruled that article 351 TFEU (article 307 
EC) does not govern intra-Union situations.42 As a result, the ECJ 
stated that Austria failed to fulfill its obligations under the 
treaty.43 
From these two cases, it follows that Belgium and Austria are 
forced, in effect, to modify their policies on access to higher or 
university education, not as a result of EU harmonization, which 
is not allowed in the field of education or vocational training, but 
because of the enforcement of the treaty provisions on free 
movement and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. If 
Belgium and Austria decide to counter the increasing demand 
for higher or university education in a way consistent with these 
provisions, they might have to consider establishing a numerus 
clausus system, which is not in line with the local traditions and 
certainly not popular with the local electorate. However, after 
harshly criticizing the ruling of the ECJ, Austrian authorities 
reserved a percentage of study places to holders of an Austrian 
secondary education diploma. For instance, in relation to 
medical and pharmaceutical studies, a quota of seventy-five 
percent was adopted.44 The Communauté française de Belgique 
 
38. Id. ¶ 61. 
39. See id. ¶ 66. 
40. Id. ¶ 54. 
41. Id. ¶ 70. 
42. Id. ¶ 73. 
43. See id. ¶ 74. 
44. Clemens Rieder, Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, Judgment of the Court 
(Second Chamber) 7 July 2005, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (2006). 
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enacted similar measures.45 Although it did not take long for the 
Commission to send a letter of formal notice, infringement 
proceedings were put on hold.46 The Commission decided to 
grant Austria and Belgium a period of five years during which 
they must supply data proving that the contested measures are 
necessary to remedy the shortage of health care professionals 
practicing in Austria and Belgium, while maintaining an 
adequate level of quality in the delivery of health care services.47 
Regardless of the follow-up of these two cases, positive as 
well as negative implications of free movement must be 
recognized by the Member States. Selective application of this 
principle would put the EU project at risk. Put simply, Member 
States must take “the bitter with the sweet” of free movement law. 
B. Family Law: National Rules on Surnames 
It is uncontested that Member States retain the autonomy to 
regulate surnames. Some Member States prefer to adopt a 
“single-surname” system, whereas others allow parents to give 
more than one surname to their child. Yet, just as it happens with 
education policy, the law relating to surnames is also limited by 
free movement and EU citizenship rights. Three cases illustrate 
this point. 
In Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, the Court began by 
recognizing that EU law did not contain rules concerning the 
transliteration of Greek names into the Roman alphabet.48 The 
Court nonetheless ruled that German law, which prevented Mr. 
Konstantinidis—a Greek national working in Germany as a self-
employed masseur—from correcting the transcription of his 
name, was contrary to article 49 TFEU (article 43 EC). The Court 
reasoned that a modification in the spelling of his name could 
give rise to its different pronunciation, resulting in his clients 
confusing him with others.49 Konstantinidis was decided in 1993, 
 
45. Id. at 1717, n.39. 
46. Id. at 1716. 
47. Commission Press Release, IP/07/1788 (Nov. 28, 2007). In the meantime, the 
issue reached the ECJ on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Belgian 
Constitutional Court. See Bressol v. Gouvernement de la Communauté Française, Case 
C-73/08 (ECJ Apr. 13, 2010) (not yet reported). 
48. Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191, ¶¶ 13–
14. 
49. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16. 
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before the entry into force of the EU citizenship provisions. Yet, 
it will be shown that the rationale underlying Konstantinidis does 
not differ from that of subsequent cases, namely, national law 
putting an EU citizen at a disadvantage simply because he or she 
has exercised his or her EU rights infringes EU law.50 
Ten years later, in Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Mr. Garcia Avello 
and Ms. Weber—a Spanish-Belgian couple living in Belgium—
decided to follow Spanish law when naming their son and 
daughter; they used the first surname of the father followed by 
the first surname of the mother (“Garcia Weber”).51 However, 
the application was rejected by the Belgian Registrar for Birth, 
Marriages and Deaths, on the ground that, in Belgium, children 
bear their father’s surname.52 The ECJ held that, even though 
rules relating to surnames remain within the competences of the 
Member States, insofar as there is a link with EU law, such 
competences must be exercised in a way consistent with the 
fundamental principles thereof.53 Unlike Mr. Konstantinidis, the 
son and daughter of Mr. Garcia Avello and Ms. Weber were not 
economically active. Yet, since they were Spanish nationals 
lawfully residing in Belgium, they could invoke the EU 
citizenship provisions.54 To this effect, the ECJ ruled that Belgian 
law contravened articles 18 and 20 TFEU (articles 12 and 17 EC), 
by putting children with dual nationality at a disadvantage. They 
would have to cope with the inconveniences at professional and 
private levels resulting from the difficulties in benefiting, in one 
 
50. Advocate General Jacobs agreed with the ECJ, holding that the German rule on 
transliteration gave rise to discrimination. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 
Konstantinidis, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191, ¶ 46. However, he added that the challenged 
measure could also be set aside for non-compliance with fundamental rights. Id. The 
Advocate General reckoned that a person having exercised his right to free movement is 
“entitled to a common code of fundamental values” which is binding upon the host 
Member State and that regardless of the presence of discrimination, a free mover “is 
entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in order to oppose any 
violation of his fundamental rights.” Id. 
51. Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 15. 
52. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
53. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Elsen v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte, Case C-
135/99, [2000] E.C.R. I-10,409, ¶ 33). 
54. See id. ¶¶ 27–28 (pointing out that the fact that the children also have Belgian 
nationality was irrelevant). In any event, the ECJ indicated that Belgium could not deny 
recognition of their Spanish nationality “by imposing additional requirements, with a 
view to the exercise of fundamental freedoms provided for in the treaty.” See Airola v. 
Commission, Case 21/74, [1975] E.C.R. 221, ¶¶ 10–11; Micheletti v. Delegación del 
Gobierno en Cantabria, Case C-369/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, ¶ 10. 
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Member State of which they are nationals, from the documents 
or diplomas obtained in another Member State of which they are 
also nationals.55 Belgium tried to justify its law on two grounds: 
preventing the risks of confusion as to the identity or parentage 
of persons and facilitating integration.56 The ECJ rejected both 
arguments. First, it held that the Belgian measure was not 
indispensable, as it could adapt itself to accommodate 
circumstances such as the ones of the case.57 Moreover, in light of 
the scale of migration within the EU, the identity and family ties 
of a person residing in a Member State cannot be assessed solely 
by reference to the laws applicable in that Member State.58 On 
the contrary, the recognition of the rules governing names of 
other Member States could actually contribute to reducing the 
risks of confusion.59 Second, Belgian law was neither necessary 
nor appropriate to promote integration, given that it hindered 
the coexistence of different systems for the attribution of 
surnames of persons residing in the country.60 Consequently, 
Belgian law could not be justified. 
Finally, in Grunkin-Paul,61 delivered in 2008, similar 
questions as those addressed in Garcia Avello were raised. Dr. Paul 
and Mr. Grunkin—two German citizens living in Denmark—
decided to name their son Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul. In 
spite of the fact that Leonhard is German, Danish law was 
applicable because his parents resided in Denmark at the time of 
his birth. The use of a double-barreled surname composed of the 
surnames of both the father and the mother was permitted under 
Danish law.62 However, when his parents approached the 
German registry office, the latter refused to recognize the 
surname of the child.63 German authorities reasoned that, in 
accordance with article 10 of the Law Introducing the German 
Civil Code, the surname of a person is determined by the law of 
his or her nationality.64 Since the German Civil Code precluded 
 
55. Garcia-Avello, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 36. 
56. Id. ¶ 40. 
57. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 
58. See id. ¶¶ 47–49. 
59. See id. ¶¶ 42–49. 
60. See id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
61. Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639. 
62. See id. ¶ 3. 
63. See id. ¶ 7. 
64. Id. 
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the use of a double-barreled surname, the registration of 
Leonhard’s surname as provided by Danish law was not possible. 
In civil proceedings brought by Leonhard’s parents, the referring 
court questioned the compatibility of the German conflict of laws 
rule with articles 18 and 21 TFEU (articles 12 and 18 EC).65 
At the outset, the Court recognized that the rules governing 
surnames fall under the competences of the Member States. 
However, in the presence of a link with EU law, the Member 
States must exercise this competence in compliance with EU 
law.66 It was clear that the link existed, because Leonhard is a 
German citizen living in Denmark. In relation to article 18 TFEU 
(article 12 EC), the ECJ found no discrimination. German law 
applied to all German citizens alike.67 Yet, the German conflict of 
laws rule in question, as applied in the concrete case, led to an 
outcome in breach of article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC). As 
indicated in Garcia Avello, German law could cause serious 
“inconveniences for [Leonhard] at both professional and private 
levels.”68 Leonhard’s German nationality meant that only 
Germany could issue him a passport, but this passport would 
contain a different name than the one he was given in Denmark. 
These divergences would raise doubts concerning his identity 
and suspicions of misrepresentation. Likewise, in recalling Garcia 
Avello, the ECJ held that it would be difficult for Leonhard to use 
the diplomas or documents obtained in Denmark when 
returning to Germany. Therefore, by placing some German 
nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised 
their freedom to live and reside in another Member State, 
German law constituted a restriction of the rights guaranteed by 
article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC).69 
The ECJ rejected the justifications put forward by Germany. 
According to Germany, its legislation sought to ensure that 
siblings have the same name. Additionally, Germany argued that 
its law treated all persons with the same nationality alike.70 The 
ECJ responded that the grounds put forward by Germany could 
not justify the restriction under circumstances such as those of 
 
65. See id. ¶ 13. 
66. Id. ¶ 16. 
67. See id. ¶ 20. 
68. Id. ¶ 23. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. ¶ 30. 
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the case.71 In particular, the ECJ pointed out that the German 
conflict of laws rule as well as provisions relating to surnames was 
not without exception. For instance, Germany also applied the 
criterion of residence where one of the parents lives in 
Germany.72 Likewise, the use of double-barreled surnames was 
permitted for German citizens where one of the parents is a 
national of another Member State and the name is given 
pursuant to the laws thereof.73 In any event, the ECJ pointed out 
that Germany had not proven—and in fact, not even argued—
that the Danish law on surnames was contrary to its public 
policy.74 Therefore, Leonhard could register his surname given 
in accordance with Danish law with the German authorities. 
In contrast to Konstantinidis, Garcia Avello and Grunkin-Paul 
involved EU citizens relying on EU law against their own state. 
These cases concern the capacity of Member States to define 
rules on surnames that may be given to their own citizens. 
Nationality, understood as the connecting factor between a 
Member State and its own citizens, is not always strong enough to 
insulate national law from the application of EU law.75 Stated 
differently, where there is a link that triggers the application of 
EU law, the bond between the EU and its citizens may be 
stronger than that between a Member State and its own citizens. 
At first sight, this could seem at odds with the first paragraph of 
article 20 TFEU (article 17 EC), which states that “Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not 
replace national citizenship.”76 However, even though EU 
citizenship is established by reference to national citizenship, it 
does not mean that the former is subjected to the latter. On the 
contrary, provided that there is an EU law nexus, EU citizenship 
may limit the application of rules having nationality as their 
connecting factor.77 
 
71. Id. ¶ 31. 
72. See id.  
73. See id. ¶ 37. 
74. See id. ¶ 38. 
75. See id. ¶¶ 2, 39. 
76. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 20, 2010 O.J. C. 83, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 
17, 2006 O.J. C. 321 E, at 49. 
77. See Stephen Hall, Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights, 21 
EUR. L. REV. 129, 129 (1996). 
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Finally, before turning to the next section, imagine the 
following scenario. An EU citizen having the nationality of 
Member State “A” moves to Member State “B.” By means of 
deception, he then acquires by naturalization the nationality of 
Member State “B,” losing simultaneously his original nationality. 
Subsequently, Member State “B” decides to revoke its nationality 
and because of the non-revival of the original nationality, this 
person becomes stateless. Does EU law oppose this situation, 
which is inspired from Rottmann, decided in 2010?78 In that case, 
the ECJ held that “it is not contrary to [EU] law, in particular to 
Article 17 EC [article 20 TFEU], for a Member State to withdraw 
from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that State acquired 
by naturalization when that nationality has been obtained by 
deception, on condition that the decision to withdraw observes 
the principle of proportionality.”79 In cross-border situations, a 
Member State does not enjoy full discretion to strip a citizen of 
the Union from his nationality and, consequently, from his EU 
citizenship. On the contrary, the ECJ reasoned that national 
authorities must strike the right balance between the public 
interest of Member States in protecting nationality—understood 
as “the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between 
 
78. Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08 (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet reported); see 
also Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Rottmann (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet 
reported) (concluding that, even though rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality 
remain within the competence of the Member States, these powers must be exercised in 
compliance with EU law; for instance, treaty provisions on EU citizenship would oppose 
a national law that deprives an EU citizen of his nationality simply because he 
established his permanent residence in a Member State other than that of which he is a 
national). In the Advocate General’s view, “in compliance with EU law” must be 
understood broadly, so that it includes any legal norm pertaining to the EU legal order, 
notably customary international law. Id. The Advocate General observed that, while 
international law sought to reduce situations giving rise to stateless persons, it 
authorized the loss of nationality acquired by intentional deception. Id. Therefore, since 
Mr. Rottmann had acquired the German nationality by fraudulent means, EU law did 
not preclude Germany from ordering its revocation. Likewise, Austria was not obliged to 
revive Mr. Rottmann’s original nationality. Id. In any event, if the revocation of his 
German nationality applied retroactively, Austrian law alone would decide whether Mr. 
Rottmann was entitled to recover his Austrian nationality, provided that the principle of 
equivalence was respected. Id. 
79. Rottmann (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet reported), ¶ 59. As to the principle of 
proportionality, the ECJ held that, when examining a decision withdrawing 
naturalization, the national court must take into account the implications of such 
decision for the person concerned and his family, the gravity of the offence committed 
by that person, the time elapsed between the withdrawal decision and the naturalization 
decision, and whether the recovery of his original nationality is possible. Id. ¶ 56. 
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[a Member State] and its nationals and also the reciprocity of 
rights and duties”80—and the individual rights stemming from 
EU citizenship. 
C. Mobility of Same-Sex Married Couples 
Another aspect of family law that is likely one day to find its 
way to Luxembourg concerns the mobility of same-sex married 
couples. Like national rules on surnames, no one would question 
the premise that legalizing same-sex marriage is a political 
decision to be taken at the national level. Although same-sex 
couples enjoy some sort of legal recognition in the majority of 
Member States, only Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and most 
recently Sweden, allow same-sex marriage. Problems may arise 
when same-sex married couples decide to move to another 
Member State where their civil status is not recognized, and, 
accordingly, they cannot fully benefit from the protection of EU 
law. 
Directive 2004/3881 adopted a broad definition of “family 
member” so as to include registered partnerships.82 However, the 
European Parliament was unable to mobilize the Council to 
mention expressly that the term “spouse” laid down in article 
2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 also applies to spouses of the same 
sex. The EU legislator opted for a hands-off approach, leaving 
this sensitive decision to judicial interpretation.83 Indeed, if a 
national court asks for guidance in the interpretation of this 
 
80. Id. ¶ 51. 
81. Council Directive on the Rights of Citizens of the Union and Their Family 
Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, No. 
2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 158/77 [hereinafter Citizenship Directive], corrected version in 
2005 O.J. L 197/34 (dealing with the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States). 
82. The non-registered partner of an EU citizen is not considered a family member 
under the Directive. Id. pmbl. (5), art. 2(2), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 79, 88. However, article 3 
provides that the host Member State must facilitate the entry and residence of persons 
with whom an EU citizen has a durable relationship, provided that it can be duly 
attested. Id. art. 3(2), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 89. 
83. See HELEN TONER, PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS, FREE MOVEMENT, AND EU LAW 60–68 
(2004) (explaining that the regime laid down in the directive was the result of a political 
compromise among conservative and liberal Member States). 
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concept, the ECJ would have no choice but to provide a 
definition through the medium of common-lawmaking.84 
When confronted with the interpretation of “spouse,” the 
ECJ has three alternatives. First, under the “state of origin 
principle,” the term “spouse” may be interpreted in accordance 
with the civil law under which the marriage took place. This 
option would be the most favorable to same-sex couples, since 
the exercise of free movement rights would have no adverse 
repercussion on their civil status. However, the host Member 
State could object that this interpretation would be too intrusive, 
causing excessive erosion to its competence to regulate family law 
and exercise its police powers. 
Second, under the “host state principle,” the ECJ could 
defer to the laws of the host Member State. This option has been 
followed by the EU legislator when defining the legal effects of 
registered partnerships. Indeed, registered partners are 
considered family members only “if the legislation of the host 
Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
relevant legislation of the host Member State.”85 
Finally, the ECJ, under the concept of judicial autonomy, 
could adopt its own independent definition of “spouse” without 
referring to either the laws of the home or the host State. The 
ECJ could choose, for example, to exclude same-sex marriages 
from the scope of the directive. This solution would foster 
 
84. See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European 
Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 55 (2006). 
The authors point out that the attitude of the EU legislator is in clear contrast with that 
of the U.S. Congress. Id. Not only did Congress rule out federal common law in 
interpreting marriage, but it also exempted states from giving effect to marriages (or 
equivalent relationships) contracted under the laws of a sister state. Id. To this effect, the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) provides that, for the purposes of federal law, 
marriage is defined as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife,” and the word spouse is defined as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband 
or a wife.” Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). In addition, the DOMA also 
states that “No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” Id. § 2(a), 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C; see also TONER, supra note 83, at 42–43. 
85. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 2(2)(b), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 88. 
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uniformity and legal certainty, but it would disregard the 
sensitivities of some Member States to the benefit of others. 
Although the ECJ has not yet defined the term “spouse” 
under Directive 2004/38, one may draw some interesting insights 
from D & Sweden v. Council.86 There, the ECJ was called upon to 
define marriage with a view to determining whether certain 
benefits reserved to married couples under the staff regulations 
of officials of the European Communities (“staff regulations”) 
could be extended to same-sex registered partnerships. At the 
time, the staff regulations made no mention of registered 
partnerships.87 This, however, did not discourage the applicant 
and the Swedish Government from urging the ECJ to follow the 
law under which the partnership had been registered.88 They 
argued that if the state of registration puts same-sex registered 
partnerships and marriages on a similar footing, then the staff 
regulations should be interpreted in the same vein.89 Benefits 
given to married couples should also be given to same-sex 
registered partnerships. However, the ECJ disagreed. It began by 
recalling that the Council had rejected a similar amendment 
proposed by the Swedish Government.90 Further, the ECJ 
observed that “It is not in question that, according to the 
definition generally accepted by the Member States, the term 
marriage means a union between two persons of the opposite 
sex.”91 Finally, the ECJ noted that, even though there was a 
common trend in the Member States towards giving some sort of 
legal recognition to same-sex unions, these new legal 
arrangements could not be assimilated to marriage.92 As a result, 
the ECJ confirmed the ruling of the European General Court 
(“EGC”)—formerly the Court of First Instance—and dismissed 
the appeal. 
After this ruling, the staff regulations were amended so that 
certain benefits previously reserved to married couples are now 
also available to staff members with a registered partnership, 
 
86. D v. Council (D & Sweden), Joined Cases C-122 & C-125/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-
4319. 
87. See id. ¶¶ 2, 12. 
88. See id. ¶ 29. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. ¶ 32. 
91. Id. ¶ 34. 
92. Id. ¶ 36. 
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provided that four conditions are fulfilled.93 One of these 
conditions is that “the couple has no access to legal marriage in a 
Member State,” that is, “where the members of the couple [do 
not] meet all the conditions laid down by the legislation of a 
Member State permitting marriage of such a couple.”94 
Therefore, where a same-sex couple has access to legal marriage, 
it cannot claim benefits under a registered partnership. This 
suggests that the staff regulations recognize same-sex marriage 
legally contracted under the law of a Member State, and only 
where the latter is not possible, same-sex couples with a 
registered partnership may claim benefits. Accordingly, the 
definition of marriage provided by the ECJ in D & Sweden v. 
Council appears to have been superseded by the EU legislator. 
D & Sweden v. Council dealt with a common definition of 
marriage in a field of exclusive competence of the EU—the staff 
regulations; as such, the case involved questions of statutory 
interpretation alone. Perhaps that is why the ECJ decided to 
accommodate its interpretation of the staff regulations with the 
prevailing view of the national legal systems, as opposed to the 
notions embraced by a limited number of them.95 The ruling of 
the ECJ in this case cannot, however, be extended without 
reservation to the mobility of same-sex married couples.96 D & 
Sweden v. Council did not examine the alterations in the civil 
status of same-sex couples resulting from free movement. The 
application of the treaty provisions on free movement to national 
measures regulating the civil status of same-sex couples operates 
to frame the exercise of legislative powers by the Member States.  
Though delivered in the context of social law, Maruko97 
illustrates this point. In this case, the ECJ was asked to clarify 
whether a German compulsory occupational pension scheme 
that awarded benefits to married couples while refusing them to 
partnerships registered in Germany was compatible with 
Directive 2000/78. German law reserves marriage to different-sex 
couples while same-sex couples have access only to registered 
 
93. See Council Regulation Amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities, No. 723/2004, annex I, ¶ 97, 2004 O.J. L 124/1, at 37. 
94. Id. 
95. See D & Sweden, [2001] E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 39. 
96. See TONER, supra note 83, at 187. 
97. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, Case C-267/06, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-1757. 
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partnerships.98 For Mr. Maruko, whose registered male partner 
was insured under this pension scheme, this meant that he could 
not claim a survivor’s pension.99 He challenged the German 
pension scheme on the ground that it was contrary to Directive 
2000/78.100 After noting that the payments under the pension 
scheme constituted “pay” within the meaning of article 3 of 
Directive 2000/78, the ECJ held that “civil status and the benefits 
flowing there from are matters which fall within the competence 
of the Member States and [EU] law does not detract from that 
competence. However, it must be recalled that in the exercise of 
that competence the Member States must comply with [EU] 
law.”101 For the case at issue, this meant that Germany was free to 
decide whether same-sex registered partnerships enjoy a 
comparable civil status to marriage. If so, then any difference in 
treatment on grounds of sexual orientation produced by 
measures falling within the scope of application of Directive 
2000/78/EC is forbidden.102 Thus, the ECJ ruled that it was for 
the referring court to evaluate whether, under German law, 
same-sex registered partnerships and marriage stand on 
comparable footing. If the finding is in the affirmative, then the 
German pension scheme would be in violation of the directive, 
given that a widower’s pension was refused on the ground of the 
applicant’s sexuality.103 
In the context of free movement, the ECJ should embark on 
an analogous legal reasoning. While Member States enjoy 
absolute discretion over the definition and legal effects of 
marriage, registered partnership, divorce, and other domestic 
issues, a change in the civil status of incoming same-sex couples 
may be seen as an obstacle to free movement.104 Carpenter105 and 
the cases that followed it point in this direction. Just as “it is clear 
that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be 
 
98. See id. ¶ 63. 
99. See id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
100. Id. ¶ 23. 
101. Id. ¶ 59; see also Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Maruko, [2008] E.C.R. 
I-1757, ¶ 77. 
102. See, e.g., Eman v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, 
Case C-300/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, ¶¶ 44–45, 52–53. 
103. See Maruko, [2008] E.C.R. I-1757, ¶ 72. 
104. See TONER, supra note 83, at 254–57. 
105. Carpenter v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-
6279, ¶¶ 38–39. 
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detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions 
under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom,”106 
the adverse repercussions deriving from a change in the civil 
status of same-sex married couples would hinder free movement. 
As a consequence, in order not to recognize their legal status, the 
host Member State would be forced to rely on overriding reasons 
of general interest. The justification advanced by that Member 
State would have to be applied in compliance with fundamental 
rights, particularly the protection of family life.107 Indeed, as 
indicated by recital 31 of Directive 2004/38, implementing 
Member States are bound by fundamental rights and the 
principle of non-discrimination.108 Additionally, since the EU law 
framework stems directly from the TFEU, the EU legislator must 
also abide by it. This implies that the directive must be 
interpreted with a view to facilitating free movement, while 
having regard to the justifications put forward by the host 
Member State. Put simply, the definition of “spouse” must be 
consistent with the rationale underpinning the legal basis of the 
directive. 
Of the three aforementioned alternatives, it seems that the 
first option, the state of origin principle, is the most consistent 
with the fundamental freedoms. However, given that the EU 
legislator deferred to the judiciary, it seems appropriate to 
proceed on a case-by-case analysis. Thus, in principle, the 
definition of “spouse” would not exclude same-sex marriages 
legally entered into under the laws of a Member State. Yet, the 
host Member State would still be entitled to invoke overriding 
reasons of general interest in order to deny their legal 
 
106. See id. ¶ 39. 
107. See Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. Eind, Case C-291/05, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-10,719, ¶ 44; Commission v. Germany, Case C-441/02, [2006] E.C.R. I-
3449, ¶ 109; Commission v. Spain, Case C-503/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, ¶ 41; 
Commission v. Spain, Case C-157/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2911, ¶ 26; Mouvement Contre le 
Racisme, L’antisémitisme et la Xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgium, Case C-459/99, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-6591, ¶ 53; Carpenter, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 38; see also TONER, supra 
note 83, at 85–88 (opining that “[c]learly, the argument that the same-sex couple are 
‘family members’ under the [EU] law regulations is not ruled out by the current 
[European Court of Human Rights] stance”). 
108. Citizenship Directive No. 2004/38, pmbl. ¶ 31, 2004 O.J. L 158, at 86. This 
would mean, for example, that once a person is qualified as “a family member,” the host 
Member State cannot deprive him or her from receiving the benefits to which he or she 
is entitled under Directive 2004/38/EC just because of his or her sexual orientation, 
age, race, and the like. See id. 
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recognition. Therefore, the term “spouse” laid down in Directive 
2004/38 must be interpreted in light of the principle of mutual 
recognition. The ECJ would thus engage in a balancing exercise, 
scrutinizing whether the reasons put forward by the host Member 
State pass muster under free movement law. 
D. Direct Taxation 
In the absence of harmonization,109 the ECJ has consistently 
held that direct taxation falls within the competence of the 
Member States.110 National legislators are competent to choose 
the tax base, tax rate, and tax advantages. Most importantly, they 
enjoy absolute discretion to decide whether to exercise their tax 
powers as a “home state” (taxing the income of fiscal residents 
regardless of where it is produced) or alternatively as a “source 
state” (taxing the income on a territorial basis even if the 
taxpayer is not a resident).111 
As shown in the previous sections, insofar as there is a link 
with EU law, policy choices in the realm of direct taxation may 
not disadvantage EU citizens who exercise their rights under EU 
law. However, in contrast to education policy or family law, not 
all negative changes in the tax status of free movers may be read 
as being contrary to the treaty provisions. Given that the TFEU 
allows different national tax systems to exist side-by-side, adverse 
financial repercussions stemming directly from this juxtaposition 
 
109. See TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 114–15, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 94–95; EC Treaty, supra 
note 3, arts. 94–95, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 79–80. Some aspects of direct taxation can be 
harmonized, such as the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, 
transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member 
States. See Council Directive on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, 
Divisions, Transfer of Assets and Exchange of Shares Concerning Companies of 
Different Member States, No. 90/434, 1990 O.J. L 225/1. Yet, owing to the fact that 
unanimity is the voting rule for the harmonization of fiscal measures, there is little 
secondary legislation on direct taxation. 
110. See Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v. Burda GmbH, Case C-284/06, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-4571, ¶ 69; Oy AA v. Finland, Case C-231/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-6373, ¶ 18; Test 
Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-
374/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673, ¶ 36; Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, Case C-196/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-995, ¶ 40; Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, Case 
C-446/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10,837, ¶ 29; Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, Joined Cases C-397 & C-410/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-1727, ¶ 37. 
111. See Suzanne Kingston, A Light in the Darkness: Recent Developments in the ECJ’s 
Direct Tax Jurisprudence,  44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1321 (2007). 
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are not caught by these provisions.112 Therefore, EU law does 
not, as such, preclude double taxation of cross-border activities 
resulting from the interaction of two national tax systems. 
Avoiding the erosion of the fiscal powers retained by the 
Member States while at the same time ensuring compliance with 
the treaty provisions on free movement seems a very complex 
and delicate task, especially if one bears in mind the sensitivities 
that direct taxation awakens in the Member States. Relying on 
the principle of non-discrimination, the ECJ has, nonetheless, 
taken important steps towards the EU law framing of the exercise 
of national taxing powers. Yet due to the different criteria 
adopted by national legislators in defining their tax jurisdiction, 
the ECJ has refined the principle of non-discrimination 
according to whether a Member State is acting in a home state or 
source state capacity. 
Acting as a home state, a Member State may not distinguish 
between domestic income and income produced in another 
Member State.113 For corporate income taxation, for example, 
this means that if a Member State taxes all income generated by 
its residents regardless of where it is produced and grants a tax 
credit which is offset against tax on domestic dividends, the same 
financial treatment must be extended to dividends produced by 
companies located abroad.114 Similarly, tax incentives granted to 
residents investing domestically must also be accorded to 
residents investing in cross-border activities.115 
As for tax jurisdiction exercised territorially, in a source state 
capacity, the principle of non-discrimination essentially prevents 
 
112. See Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbueren, Case C-67/08, [2009 ] E.C.R. I-884, ¶ 35; 
Deutsche Shell v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen, Case C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-
1129, ¶ 43; Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, ¶ 
45; Lindfors v. Finland, Case C-365/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7183, ¶ 34; see also Opinion of 
Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R. 
I-11,673, ¶¶ 35–40. 
113. See Rewe Zentralfinanz v. Finanzamt Köln-Mitte, Case C-347/04, [2007] E.C.R. 
I-2647, ¶¶ 36, 70; Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v. Keller Holding GmbH, Case C-
471/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-2107, ¶¶ 34, 50; Commission v. Denmark, Case C-150/04, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-1163, ¶¶ 42–77. 
114. See, e.g., Manninen v. Finland, Case C-319/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7477, ¶ 55; Lenz 
v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol, Case C-315/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7063, ¶¶ 20–21, 49; 
Staatssecretaris van Frinanciën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, Case C-35/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
4071, ¶¶ 34–36, 62. 
115. See Svensson v. Ministre du Logement et de l’Urbanisme, Case C-484/93, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-3955, ¶¶ 5–8. 
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national authorities from taxing non-residents and residents 
differently.116 For example, tax benefits accorded to resident 
companies must also be accorded to permanent establishments 
of non-resident companies.117 Similarly, a Member State cannot 
impose a higher corporate tax to a foreign company than to 
resident companies.118 
From the foregoing, it appears that determining whether a 
tax system is discriminatory depends to a large extent on the 
choice of the comparator.119 Indeed, discrimination will not take 
place where, for tax purposes, cross-border and domestic 
situations are not objectively comparable. By way of illustration, 
this would be so where, with a view to alleviating economic 
double taxation, a source state conditions the grant of a tax 
credit on the company receiving dividends having income tax 
liability.120 In the case of outgoing dividends paid to non-resident 
companies not liable to the source state’s income tax, the latter 
may not claim access to tax credits related to these dividends. In 
those circumstances, denying tax credits to outgoing dividends is 
not a discriminatory measure, since resident and non-resident 
companies do not find themselves in a comparable situation. The 
former are subject to income tax and thus have a right to tax 
credits so that the source state does not tax the profits of the 
dividend-distributing company first and then the dividends 
themselves as income of the receiving company. By contrast, 
since non-resident companies do not pay income tax, there is no 
risk of economic double taxation imposed by the source state. 
Put simply, insofar as the source state is concerned,121 dividends 
 
116. See D.M.M.A. Arens-Sikken v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, Case C-43/07, 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6887, ¶ 52. 
117. See The Queen v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, ex parte Commerzbank AG, Case 
C-330/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-4017, ¶ 13; Commission v. France (Avoir Fiscal), Case 270/83, 
[1986] E.C.R. 273, ¶¶ 22, 27–28. 
118. See Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, Case C-311/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-2651, ¶ 
34. 
119. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Deutsche Shell GmbH v. 
Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case C-293/06, [2007] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶¶ 
28–30. 
120. See Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, Case C-374/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673, ¶¶ 70, 72, 81. 
121. The fact that outgoing dividends would be subsequently taxed by the home 
state (double taxation) cannot be seen as discrimination either, since this is just an 
adverse consequence of having parallel national tax systems. See Opinion of Advocate 
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are equally taxed for resident and non-resident companies, that 
is, only at the level of the distributing company.122 
Furthermore, the ECJ has not adopted a formalistic 
approach when qualifying two situations as comparable. In 
addition to examining the legal provisions applied to domestic 
and cross-border situations, the ECJ also makes a comparative 
assessment of the factual context.123 The classic example is 
provided by Schumacker.124 There, the ECJ ruled that 
discrimination arises where a worker earns most of his income 
(ninety percent) in the state of employment, and neither that 
state nor the state of residence takes into account his personal 
and family circumstances for the purposes of awarding tax 
benefits.125 Likewise, not only does discrimination occur where 
there is unequal treatment between domestic and cross-border 
situations, but it also manifests itself where a Member State 
awards preferential treatment to cross-border situations involving 
a given Member State.126 
It becomes more complex when it is not possible to find an 
immediate domestic equivalent to a cross-border situation. 
Deutsche Shell127 provides a good example. A German company 
sought to deduct the currency loss suffered from the repatriation 
of start-up capital previously granted to its permanent 
establishment in Italy.128 Given that currency loss is impossible in 
domestic situations, it was not deductible under either German 
 
General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R. I-
11,673, ¶¶ 83–86. 
122. Conversely, discrimination occurs where a home state adopts an exemption 
system for domestic dividends and a credit system for foreign dividends, and the first 
system affords a more favorable tax treatment than the latter. See Test Claimants in the 
FII Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-446/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,753, 
¶ 57. 
123. Michael Lang, Recent Case Law of the ECJ in Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions, 
and Contradictions, 18 EC TAX REV. 98, 101 (2009). 
124. See Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-
225; Lang, supra note 123, at 101 n.24. 
125. See Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. I-225, ¶¶ 47–49. 
126. See, e.g., Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange European Smallcap Fund 
NV, Case C-194/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-3747, ¶¶ 106–08. But see D. v. Inspecteur van 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, Case C-376/03, 
[2005] E.C.R. I-5821, ¶¶ 60–63. 
127. Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case 
C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129. 
128. See id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
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or Italian law.129 The question then arose whether the inability to 
deduct currency loss ran counter to the treaty provisions on free 
movement.130  
There are two ways of answering this question. On the one 
hand, one may adopt a restriction-based approach whereby non-
discriminatory measures on direct taxation fall within the scope 
of these provisions,131 similar to other areas of substantive law.132 
However, the adoption of a restriction-based approach runs the 
risk of requiring all negative changes in the tax status of free 
movers to be submitted to strict scrutiny.133 Arguably, in order 
not to substantially diminish the powers retained by the Member 
States, the adoption of a restriction-based approach must be 
examined with caution.134 On the other hand, one may read the 
principle of non-discrimination as requiring not only that 
objectively comparable situations are treated equally, but also 
that different situations are treated unequally.135 In Deutsche Shell, 
the ECJ ultimately endorsed this latter rationale. Since currency 
losses may only arise in cross-border situations, a company having 
exercised its free movement rights has to face higher economic 
risks than domestic companies.136 Consequently, it would be 
contrary to the principle of non-discrimination for Member 
States to ignore this distinctive feature when awarding tax 
deductions or credits. Moreover, Deutsche Shell is not an isolated 
case, but it reflects a jurisprudential trend, according to which a 
 
129. See id. ¶¶ 11–21. 
130. See id. ¶ 27. 
131. This was the approach followed by Advocate General Sharpston. See Opinion 
of Advocate General Sharpston, Deutsche Shell, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶ 34 (arguing that 
in this case, trying to find a comparator for currency loss would amount to what in social 
law is like finding a comparator for a pregnant woman). 
132. See, e.g., Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, Case C-384/93, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-1141, ¶¶ 29–31 (services); Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli 
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165 (workers). 
133. See Kingston, supra note 111, at 1330–31; see also Richard Lyal, Non-
discrimination and Direct Tax in Community Law, 12 EC TAX REV. 68, 74 (2003). 
134. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of the 
ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-374/04, [2006] ECR I-11,673. 
135. See Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, Case C-311/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-2651, ¶ 
26; Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-225, ¶ 30. 
136. Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case 
C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶¶ 29–30. 
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more elaborate concept of discrimination is preferred to a 
restriction-based approach.137 
Finally, the case law of the ECJ has not been immune from 
criticism. Some scholars argue that as a result of applying the 
principle of non-discrimination to both home and source states, 
the Court has failed to follow a consistent tax policy.138 Others 
posit that the ECJ has engaged in judicial activism by creating 
new “taxing rights” and by unduly bending the tax jurisdiction of 
the Member States to the benefit of free movers.139 However, 
most of the perceived inconsistencies or tensions could easily be 
addressed by EU secondary legislation. Given the lack of 
consensus among Member States to pass such legislation, the ECJ 
is called upon to enforce EU primary law, that is, to strike the 
best possible balance between not depriving the Member States 
from their taxing powers while making sure that direct taxation 
does not become an insurmountable obstacle to market 
integration. Of course, even if divergences between the Member 
States were to disappear so that legislation could be passed, the 
treaty provisions on free movement would still operate to frame 
the agreed-upon tax paradigm. This is clearly demonstrated by 
the case law involving indirect taxation, where the ECJ’s decisions 
complete the system laid down by the EC legislator.140 In the 
absence of a legislative consensus on direct taxation 
underpinning a certain tax policy, the ECJ has decided not to 
examine direct taxation beyond the bounds of discrimination. 
 
137. See, e.g., Belgium v. Truck Ctr. SA, Case C-282/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-10,767; Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-446/04, [2006] 
E.C.R. I-11,753; Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673; 
Cadbury Schweppes v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-196/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-
7995; Conijn v. Hamburg-Nord, Case C-46/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-6137; Ritter-Coulais v. 
Germersheim, Case C-152/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1711; Bouanich v. Skatteverket, Case C-
265/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-923; Mobistar SA v. Commune de Fléron, Joined Cases C-544–
45/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-7723; Blanckaert v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, Case C-
512/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-7685. 
138. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the 
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L. J. 1186, 1219 (2006) (arguing that 
prohibiting discrimination based on destination—the home state—is ultimately 
inconsistent with prohibiting discrimination based on origin—the source state). 
139. See id. at 1201. 
140. See Frans Vanistendael, Does the ECJ Have the Power of Interpretation to Build a 
Tax System Compatible with the Fundamental Freedoms?, 17 EC TAX REV. 52, 52 (2008) 
(inviting the Court to take an analogous approach to that followed for indirect 
taxation). 
  
2010] FEDERALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW AT THE ECJ 1367 
But market integration driven without any support or guidance 
from the legislature is doomed to suffer from shortcomings.141 
Far from being a sign of inconsistency, this jurisprudence shows 
that the ECJ pays full respect for the competences retained by the 
Member States in an area so fundamental to national 
sovereignty.142 
E. Health Care: Patient Mobility 
Most of the litigation involving patient mobility has dealt 
with situations “where a patient goes to another Member State 
with the explicit goal of receiving medical care at the expense of 
the health care system with which he is insured.”143 Initially, 
mobility was confined to the cases provided for by article 22 (1) 
of Regulation No. 1408/71144 (now article 20 of Regulation No. 
883/2004)145. Adopted on the legal basis of article 48 TFEU 
(article 51 EC), this regulation sought to facilitate the 
coordination of the social security rights of migrant workers and 
their families. The regulation laid down a system of prior 
authorization for non-emergency treatment. Article 22(1)(c) 
indicates that Member States must grant authorization where the 
treatment concerned is provided for by the state of affiliation and 
it cannot be given within the time normally necessary for 
obtaining it,146 taking into account the patient’s current state of 
 
141. See Damseaux v. Belgium, Case C-128/08, [2009] E.C.R. 6823, ¶ 33; 
Kerckhaert v. Belgium, Case C-513/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,967, ¶ 22; see also Koen 
Lenaerts & Ludovic Bernardeau, L’encadrement Communautaire de la Fiscalité Directe, 43 
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 19 (2007). 
142. See Karen Banks, The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax 
Measures: Guarding Against Protectionism or Second-Guessing National Policy Choices?, 33 
EUR. L. REV. 482, 506 (2008). 
143. Koen Lenaerts & Tinne Heremans, Contours of a European Social Union in the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Justice, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 101, 108 (2006). 
144. See Council Regulation on the Application of Social Security Schemes to 
Employed Persons and Their Families Moving Within the Community, No. 1408/71, art. 
22(1), 149 J.O. 2 (1971), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. (II) 1971, at 416. 
145. See European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Coordination of 
Social Security Systems, No. 883/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. L 166/1, at 31. 
146. Council Regulation No. 1408/71, supra note 144, art. 22(1)(c), O.J. Eng. Spec. 
Ed. (II) 1971, at 428. By contrast, article 20 of Regulation No. 883/2004 provides that 
the treatment must be provided within a time limit that is “medically justifiable, taking 
into account [the patient’s] current state of health and the probable course of his 
illness.” European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Coordination of Social 
Security Systems, No. 883/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. L 166/1, at 31. 
 1368 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1338 
health and probable course of illness. In essence, patients treated 
under article 22(1)(c) are covered as if they were insured under 
the regime of the host Member State.147 However, given the 
limited scope of this provision and the reluctance of Member 
States to grant authorizations, free movement of patients was 
marginal.148 
Patients thus sought to bypass the limitations of article 22 by 
relying directly on the treaty provisions on free movement. For 
this strategy to succeed, health care services provided in the 
context of a social security scheme would have to constitute 
economic activities. The ECJ found this to be the case. In 
contrast to national education systems149 and to the application 
of the treaty provisions on competition,150 the ECJ has 
consistently held that for the purpose of free movement, these 
services are of an economic nature.151 Accordingly, insofar as 
there is a cross-border element, medical service providers,152 as 
well as patients, may invoke their free movement rights. 
 
147. See Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes, Case C-
368/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-5363, ¶ 32. But see Inizan v. Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie 
des Hauts-de-Seine, Case C-56/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-12,403, ¶¶ 20–21 (stating that “the 
length of the period during which benefits are provided alone [remains] to be governed 
by the legislation of the . . . Member State [of affiliation]”). 
148. See Anthony Dawes, “Bonjour Herr Doctor:” National Healthcare Systems, the 
Internal Market and Cross-border Medical Care within the European Union, 33 LEGAL ISSUES 
ECON. INTEGRATION 167, 167 (2006) (arguing that free movement of patients under this 
regime was “more of an illusion then [sic] a reality”). 
149. See Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365, ¶¶ 17–19. There, 
the ECJ indicated three cumulative characteristics that prevented national systems of 
public education from having an economic nature. First, there is no agreement on the 
price to be paid for the services received; second, the Member States are not driven by 
profit making when adopting their policies; and third, public spending primarily 
finances these services. Id. 
150. Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria v. Commission, 
Case C-205/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. I-6295, ¶¶ 8, 25 (holding that activities adopted on the 
basis of the principles of universal health coverage and solidarity could not be qualified 
as economic). 
151. See The Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, Case 
C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 18; Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 
& 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 377, ¶ 16. 
152. This section will not examine national rules that impede health care service 
providers from providing services temporarily or permanently in the host Member State. 
For cases on this issue see, for example, ; Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes v. Saarland 
and Ministerium für Justiz, Gesundheit und Soziales, Joined Cases C-171 & C-172/07, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-4171; Commission v. Italy, Case C-531/06, [2009 ] E.C.R. I-4103; and 
Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierung, Case C-169/07, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-1721. 
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However, article 168(7) TFEU (article 152(5) EC), states 
that “[u]nion action shall respect the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the definition of their health policy and for 
the organization and delivery of health services and medical 
care.”153 This means that Member States are free to opt for a 
system based on benefits in kind or reimbursement; that they 
enjoy discretion in establishing the entitlements covered by their 
social security schemes;154 that they may cap or fix a flat rate of 
reimbursement;155 or that national authorities are entitled to 
establish a waiting list before a patient can undergo a highly 
demanded medical treatment.156 
Yet, the margin of maneuver enjoyed by the Member States 
in the field of health care cannot render the application of the 
treaty provisions on free movement devoid of purpose. As 
Advocate General Tesauro so eloquently noted, article 168(7) 
TFEU (article 152 EC) “by no means implies that the social 
security sector constitutes an island beyond the reach of [EU] 
law.”157 Or, in the Court’s own words, although “[EU] law does 
not detract from the power of the Member States to organize 
their social security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions 
intended to govern the organization of health services . . . in 
exercising that power, . . . the Member States must comply with 
[EU] law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the 
freedoms of movement.”158 
It follows that it is for the ECJ to strike the right balance 
between, on the one hand, ensuring that social security systems 
are not obstacles to free movement, and, on the other hand, not 
depriving the Member States from all competence in this field. 
 
153. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 168(7), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 123; EC Treaty, supra note 
3, art. 152(5), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 115. 
154. See B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms), 
Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶¶ 86–87; Duphar BV v. The Netherlands, Case 
238/82, [1984] E.C.R. 523, ¶ 17. 
155. See Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappig OZ Zorgverzekeringen 
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 98. 
156. See Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, 
¶ 67. 
157. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des 
Employés Privés, Case C-120/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 17. 
158. Hartlauer v. Wiener, Case C-169/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1721 ¶ 29; see also 
Commission v. Germany, Case C-141/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6935, ¶¶ 22–23; Watts, [2006] 
E.C.R. I-4325, ¶¶ 92, 146; Duphar, [1984] E.C.R. 523, ¶ 16. 
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The application of the EU law framework in the realm of social 
security is not an easy task, for two main reasons. Vertically, social 
security systems operate on a territorial basis. Their sustainability 
lies in the principle that benefits are awarded to those who 
contribute to the state treasury. Therefore, exporting social 
rights beyond territorial borders would upset the financial 
stability that national authorities endeavor to reach in spite of 
limited resources and increasing demand. Horizontally, social 
security and market integration are governed by different 
rationales. Social security is based on a system of cross-subsidies, 
whereby some persons contribute more than what they receive 
while others receive more than what they contribute. Financial 
solidarity is thus the underlying principle of social security 
systems, which is at odds with the dynamics governing market 
integration and free competition.159 As a result, by welcoming an 
alternative system of patient mobility, the ECJ has agreed to 
engage in the delicate challenge of delineating the contours of a 
“European Social Union.”160 
How has the ECJ reconciled individual interests to move 
with a fair distribution of limited health care resources? In the 
seminal cases Decker161 and Kohll,162 the Court took the first steps 
toward framing the capacity of the Member States to organize 
and deliver their national health services. Unlike medical 
treatment received or medical products bought domestically, 
Luxembourg conditioned the reimbursement of the cost for 
medical services received or medical products bought in another 
Member State upon obtaining a prior authorization. The Court 
ruled that this requirement was an obstacle to free movement,163 
holding that the system of prior authorization dissuades patients 
from purchasing foreign medical goods and from receiving 
services abroad. As for Luxembourg’s justification, the ECJ 
 
159. See Christopher Newdick, Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing 
Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity, 43 COMMON MKT .L. REV. 1645 (2006) 
(arguing that the ECJ should only review national measures pertaining to the 
organization and delivery of health care on procedural grounds, otherwise the national 
commitment to welfare would be eroded and the credibility of the EU would be 
undermined). 
160. See Lenaerts & Heremans, supra note 143, at 114–15. 
161. Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831. 
162. Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931. 
163. See Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 36 (free movement of goods); Kohll, [1998] 
ECR I-1931, ¶ 35 (freedom to provide services). 
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recognized the interest of the Member States in avoiding “the 
risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social 
security system”164 and in “maintaining a balanced medical and 
hospital service opened to all”165 as well as guaranteeing “the 
maintenance of a treatment facility or medical service on 
national territory.”166 Yet, since the social security system at issue 
reimbursed health care expenses at a flat rate, the ECJ found that 
there was actually no financial risk.167 Services provided in a 
Member State other than Luxembourg would not be more 
burdensome than internal provisions of care. As a result, the 
Court ruled that the system of prior authorization was contrary to 
the treaty. 
Decker and Kohll suggest that, in contrast to the regime 
introduced by Regulation No. 1408/71 (now Regulation No. 
883/2004),168 where patients are treated as though they were 
insured in the host Member State, the application of the treaty 
provisions on free movement in the realm of health care implies 
that patients should be treated as though the treatment were 
provided in the Member State of affiliation. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that tariffs of reimbursement and entitlements are 
defined by the regulations of the Member State of affiliation, so 
that the economic implications of patient mobility cannot be 
more onerous than domestic provisions of care.169 In addition, it 
follows from Decker and Kohll that it is virtually impossible for the 
Member States to justify a system of prior authorization for 
ambulant health care. To this date, the ECJ has not upheld a 
system of prior authorization for non-hospital services. Moreover, 
the Court has relied on a quantitative argument to play down the 
dramatic consequences of patient mobility for non-hospital 
services. In its view, linguistic, geographic, economic, and 
cultural barriers would significantly limit the number of cross-
border patients seeking ambulant care.170 Finally, Decker and Kohll 
 
164. Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 39; Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, ¶ 41. 
165. Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 50. 
166. Id. ¶ 51. 
167. See Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 40; Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 42. 
168. See supra notes 144–55 and accompanying text. 
169. See Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen 
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] ECR I-4509, ¶ 98; Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 42. 
170. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶¶ 95–97. 
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left unanswered two important questions,171 namely (1) whether 
this line of case law also applied to social security systems based 
on benefits in kind, and (2) whether a system of prior 
authorization for intramural care could be justified. 
As for the first question, contrary to the views advanced by 
Advocates General Saggio and Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,172 the ECJ 
replied in the affirmative. In Smits & Peerbooms, the ECJ ruled 
that the treaty provisions on free movement apply regardless of 
whether social security systems are based on benefits in kind or 
on a reimbursement scheme.173 In order for a medical treatment 
to constitute a service, the patients are not required to assume 
health care expenses directly. Instead, what matters is for the 
medical treatment to be provided for remuneration, that is, as 
consideration for the service in question.174 In Müller-Fauré,175 the 
Court added that, just as in social security systems based on 
reimbursement, patients insured under a social security system 
based on benefits in kind who travel to another Member State 
with a view to receiving medical treatment first have to pay the 
doctors providing the medical services and then request the 
refund of the expenses from the Member State in which they are 
insured.176 From this perspective, not only does the difference 
between the two types of social security systems disappear, but 
also the economic nature of the medical services provided 
becomes self-evident.177  
As for the second question, the ECJ has held that intramural 
care is not an exception to the application of the free movement 
principle.178 In effect, “the application of any national rules 
which have the effect of making the provision of services between 
 
171. See BARNARD, supra note 30, at 365. 
172. See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. 
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms), Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473; 
Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités 
Chrétiennes, Case C-368/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-5363. 
173. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473. 
174. See id. ¶ 58 
175. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509. 
176. See id. ¶ 39. 
177. See Vassilis G. Hatzopoulos, Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but 
Healing Patients? The European Market for Health Care Services After the Judgments of the ECJ 
in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683, 692–93 (2002) (opining 
that the ECJ relied on an “atypical” situation to find the economic nature of health care 
services). 
178. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 53. 
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Member States more difficult than the provision of services 
purely within a Member State”179 needs to be justified. However, 
this does not mean that the ECJ obviates the possibility that 
patient mobility involving intramural care may threaten the 
financial balance of social security systems and run the risk of 
disturbing health care planning. In Smits & Peerbooms, Müller-
Fauré, and more recently in Watts, the ECJ acknowledged that a 
system of prior authorization for intramural care may be justified. 
Since intramural care requires Member States to plan “the 
number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of 
their organization and the equipment with which they are 
provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they 
are able to offer,”180 to guarantee “sufficient and permanent 
access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment”181 
on the national territory, and “to control costs and to prevent, as 
far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and human 
resources,”182 the ECJ has ruled that a system of prior 
authorization is “both necessary and reasonable.”183 However, a 
system of prior authorization may only comply with the principle 
of proportionality insofar as a series of substantive and 
procedural conditions are fulfilled. In relation to the former 
conditions, although the Member State of affiliation may refuse 
to authorize an experimental or unconventional treatment, its 
decision must be based on up-to-date international scientific 
information.184 Additionally, unless the Member State of 
affiliation provides an equally effective treatment without undue 
delay, an authorization must be granted. When evaluating 
whether a treatment can be given without undue delay, the 
competent national authorities must examine, on a case-by-case 
 
179. Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 
94; see also Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 61; Kohll v. Union des Caisses de 
Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 33. 
180. Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 76; see also Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-
4325, ¶ 108; Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen 
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 77. 
181. Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 109; Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 
78; see also Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 79. 
182. Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 109; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 80; 
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 79. 
183. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 110; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 81; 
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 80. 
184. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 94. 
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basis, the medical condition and history of the patient, the level 
of pain suffered by him, and how the nature of his disability 
could adversely affect his professional activities.185 As for the 
procedural conditions,186 the system of prior authorization must 
be accessible to patients. Decisions of the competent authority 
must be based on objective, predetermined, and non-
discriminatory criteria. Finally, decisions must be taken within a 
reasonable time and subject to judicial or quasi-judicial review. 
Furthermore, with a view to curtailing the degree of 
discretion enjoyed by the Member States under article 22(1) of 
Regulation No. 1408/71, the ECJ has decided to partially 
extrapolate its case law under article 56 TFEU (article 49 EC).187 
As mentioned above, under this provision, the competent 
Member State may not refuse to issue an authorization if medical 
treatment cannot be given within “the time normally necessary” 
for obtaining it.188 In Inizan,189 the ECJ was called upon to clarify 
how “normally necessary” must be interpreted. Quoting Smits & 
Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré, the ECJ ruled that “normally 
necessary” must be read mutatis mutandis as the Court interprets 
“without undue delay” under article 56 TFEU (article 49 EC).190 
In the same way, the ECJ also held that article 22 (1) is subject to 
the same procedural conditions as those introduced under this 
treaty provision.191 However, in spite of this partial alignment, 
important differences between the two systems of cross-border 
health care persist, especially with regard to the level of 
reimbursement of costs,192 traveling costs, and accommodation 
expenses.193 
 
185. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 90; Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-
5473, ¶ 104. 
186. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 116; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 85; 
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 90. 
187. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 56, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 70; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 
49, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 34–35. 
188. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 2. 
189. Inizan v. Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, Case C-
56/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-12,403. 
190. See id. ¶¶ 44–46. 
191. See id. ¶ 48. 
192. For patient mobility directly based on the treaty, the level of reimbursement 
may be limited to the cost of equivalent treatment in the Member State of affiliation. By 
contrast, under the regulation, health care will be covered as if the cross-border patient 
  
2010] FEDERALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW AT THE ECJ 1375 
In summary, the case law on patient mobility demonstrates 
that the ECJ has not tilted the balance in favor of either market 
integration or social security. On the one hand, by drawing the 
distinction between hospital and non-hospital services,194 the ECJ 
makes sure that the overriding reasons of general interest put 
forward by the Member States are significant and real. On the 
other hand, while recognizing that a system of prior 
authorization for hospital care is “both necessary and 
reasonable” in order to optimize the allocation of limited 
financial, logistical and professional resources, the ECJ also 
makes sure that Member States do not exercise this power 
arbitrarily. Member States must adduce the medical reasons 
based on international, objective, and scientific criteria. They 
must also adopt their decision in accordance with a process that 
safeguards patients’ right to move. Most importantly, the 
principle of proportionality reminds the Member States that 
before making a decision, the latter must take into account the 
right of patients to move freely within the EU. 
II. FRAMING THE PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE MEMBER 
STATES 
The application of EU law is decentralized.195 It is for the 
national courts, as juges de l’Union, to enforce EU rights. There is 
thus a division of tasks between the two levels of governance: EU 
law provides the right, while national rules of procedure provide 
the remedy.196 This distribution of power, embodied in the 
 
was insured under the regime of the host Member State. See Acereda Herrera v. Servicio 
Cántabro de Salud, Case C-466/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-5341, ¶ 1. 
193. While these types of costs are not covered under the regulation, they are for 
cross-border patients relying directly on the treaty, provided that the Member State of 
affiliation covers these costs for patients moving internally (for example, from a city to 
another city of the same Member State). Compare Leichtle v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 
Case C-8/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-2641 with Acereda Herrera, [2006] E.C.R. I-5341. 
194. Nevertheless, this distinction may be difficult to apply. For example, is this 
distinction governed by the type of medical treatment or the place where it takes place? 
See Elies Steyger, National Health Care Systems Under Fire (but not too heavily), 29 LEGAL 
ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 97, 105 (2002). 
195. See generally KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2006); TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 418–23; MICHAEL 
DOUGAN, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE (2004). 
196. See Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Kühne v. Productschap voor 
Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004] E.C.R. I-837, ¶ 18; see also Walter Van 
Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV.. 501, 502 (2000). 
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principle of procedural autonomy, requires the Member States to 
organize the administration of justice. To enforce their EU 
rights, applicants must thus look at national law for rules on 
limitation periods, compensation, unjust enrichment, standing 
before national courts, the effects of final administrative 
decisions, and so forth. 
Yet, in the absence of harmonization, EU rights would be 
seriously weakened if their enforcement were at the Member 
States’ absolute mercy. The principles of primacy and direct 
effect would be reduced to programmatic postulates. That is why, 
paraphrasing the U.S. Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron, primacy 
and direct effect must “make constitutional ideas into living 
truths,”197 that is, EU rights must be accompanied by effective 
remedies.198 
Therefore, an underlying tension exists between, on the one 
hand, the principles of primacy and direct effect and, on the 
other hand, the principle of national procedural autonomy. 
Extreme solutions are barred. There is neither a 
communitarization of all rules of procedure, nor are the rules 
merely left alone when they adversely affect the effectiveness of 
EU rights. Instead, when two constitutional principles point at 
diverging directions, balancing emerges as the adequate solution. 
To this effect, the ECJ has conditioned the lawfulness of national 
rules of procedure upon compliance with two principles, namely 
the principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness. 
While the first principle is no less than the extrapolation of 
the general principle of non-discrimination to the law of 
remedies,199 the second requires that the enforcement of EU 
 
197. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958); see also TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 
422. 
198. This principle is now codified in article 19 TEU post-Lisbon which provides 
that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law.” TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 19, 
2010 O.J. C 83, at 27. 
199. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Impact v. Minister for Agric. & Food, 
Case C-268/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶ 67. The ECJ has ruled that claims based on EU 
law must not be treated less favorably than claims based on national law. In order to 
apply this principle, “the purpose and cause of action” of both claims must be similar. 
Levez v. Jennings Ltd. (Harlow Pools), Case C-326/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-7835, ¶ 41. The 
principle of equivalence includes both direct and indirect discrimination. See Preston v. 
Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust v. Midland Bank plc, Case C-78/98, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-3201, ¶ 51; Harlow Pools, [1998] E.C.R. I-7835, ¶¶ 46–47; see also Transportes 
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rights at the national level must not be “virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult,” that is, national rules of procedure must 
ensure a basic threshold of judicial protection.200 Thus, these two 
principles operate as a framework limiting the procedural 
autonomy of the Member States. 
There are three phases that can be distinguished in the case 
law as to the application of this framework.201 First, from the 
beginning until the mid-1980s, the ECJ took a very conservative 
approach. National remedies were the rule, and EU law “was not 
intended to create new remedies.”202 By contrast, from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, the ECJ adopted a very active stand. It 
was posited that the ECJ had embarked on the harmonization of 
the law of remedies.203 A look at cases such as Francovich204 and 
Brasserie205 reveals that these assertions were not entirely 
misguided. In fact, this situation led some scholars to argue that 
the ECJ often tilted the balance in favor of EU law,206 accusing it 
of not being an impartial umpire. Today, these criticisms may still 
echo in the mind of some commentators207 when reading cases 
such as Köbler,208 Khüne,209 or Muñoz.210 
A close look at recent cases, however, shows a different 
picture. Having laid down the foundations of the EU remedial 
edifice, the ECJ has moved onto a new paradigm. Currently, it is 
 
Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v. Administración del Estado, Case C-118/08, [2010] 
E.C.R. __, [2010] 2 C.M.L.R. 1053, 1074. 
200. See Van der Weerd v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, 
Joined Cases C-222 & C-225/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-4233, ¶ 17. 
201. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 420–22; DOUGAN, supra note 195, at 28–34. 
202. Rewe Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, Case 158/80, 
[1981] E.C.R. 1805, ¶ 44. 
203. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 268 
(2006) (arguing that “[i]n the second phase, the [ECJ] adopted a much more 
interventionist stance in which greater emphasis was given to the need to ensure the 
effective protection of [Union] rights”). 
204. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357. 
205. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined Cases C-46 & 
C-48/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-1029. 
206. See Mark Hoskins, Tilting the Balance: Supremacy and National Procedural Rules, 
21 EUR. L. REV. 365, 367 (1996). 
207. See Peter J. Wattel, Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go on Meeting Like 
This, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 177, 190 (2004) 
208. Köbler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10,239. 
209. Kühne v. Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-837. 
210. Muñoz y Cia SA v. Frumar Ltd., Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-7289. 
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less assertive, and its approach towards the law of remedies has 
become more nuanced. The Court follows an “objective 
justification model”211 or “selective deference,”212 whereby some 
cases are left to the national courts to decide, while the ECJ takes 
a more proactive attitude in others. One could also suggest that 
in cooperation with national courts, the ECJ strives to protect the 
interests embodied in the national rules of procedure while 
maintaining a sufficient level of judicial protection of EU 
rights.213 At this time, it cannot be argued that the ECJ does not 
pay attention to the principle of procedural autonomy. On the 
contrary, by taking into account the procedural principles 
enshrined in national law, such as legal certainty, the right of 
defense, the fair conduct of litigation, or procedural economy, 
the ECJ and national courts work hand in hand to improve the 
quality of enforcement of EU rights. 
A. Respecting National Standing Doctrines 
In states with common-law traditions, applicants are often 
allowed to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against possible 
acts of public authorities. There is generally no need for the 
applicants to obtain an administrative act before they can 
challenge the legislation on which the act is based. For instance, 
in the United Kingdom, the problem that gave rise to the 
discussion in UPA214 and later in Jégo-Quéré215 would not have 
arisen. Applicants in the United Kingdom can even bring 
proceedings against the intention of the legislator to implement 
a directive.216 Likewise, in light of the principle of equivalence, 
applicants in the United Kingdom enjoy a declaratory-type action 
 
211. DOUGAN, supra note 195, at 30. 
212. TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 418–22. 
213. See Andrea Biondi, How to Go Ahead as an EU Law National Judge, 15 EUR. PUB. 
L. 225, 238 (2009) (noting that “the relationship between the ECJ and the national 
courts is pretty healthy, with both sets of courts striving to provide efficient remedies to 
guarantee the rights of the citizens”). 
214. Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council (UPA), Case C-50/00P, [2002] 
E.C.R. I-6677, ¶¶ 7–8, 61. 
215. Commission v. Jégo-Quéré, Case C-263/02P, [2004] E.C.R. I-3425, ¶ 1. 
216. See Int’l Assoc. of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Sec’y of State for Transport, Case 
C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057; The Queen, ex rel. Alliance for Natural Health v. Sec’y 
of State for Health, Joined Cases C-154 & C-155/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-6451, ¶¶ 49–51; The 
Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd., Case C-491/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-11,453. 
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to challenge national laws conflicting with EU law. By contrast, in 
civil-law states, direct and free-standing challenges against 
legislation are seen as unduly intruding upon the proper 
functioning of political institutions.217 Applicants wishing to 
contest the lawfulness of legislative measures must seek indirect 
challenges, such as an action for damages or raise a plea of 
illegality against such measures when seeking the annulment of 
the administrative act based on them. It follows that in states 
governed by common-law traditions, applicants have easier access 
to direct legal remedies.  
Does this mean that Member States banning free-standing 
declaratory-type actions are in breach of the principle of 
effectiveness? Far from being trivial, this question strikes at the 
epicenter of constitutional justice. Defining when and how 
applicants may challenge legislative measures has important 
repercussions not only for applicants’ rights, but also for the 
principle of separation of powers. Granting an open access to 
courts would result in a critique of the judiciary for intruding in 
the political process.218 In 2007, the ECJ answered this question 
in the negative in Unibet.219 That would be otherwise “only if it 
were apparent from the overall scheme of the national legal 
system in question that no legal remedy existed which made it 
possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual’s 
rights under [EU] law.”220 Consequently, the principle of 
effectiveness is neutral vis-à-vis direct and indirect legal remedies. 
Nonetheless, where applicants are forced to face criminal 
penalties or administrative sanctions in order to avail themselves 
of the only possible indirect remedy, the ECJ considers that this 
principle is being infringed.221  
It follows that the Member States are free to decide how 
national legislative measures conflicting with EU law may be 
challenged, provided that a minimum threshold of judicial 
protection is attained, it being understood that a remedy which 
 
217. See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why It 
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2744 & n.2 (2003). 
218. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1983). 
219. Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-2271. 
220. Id. ¶ 41. 
221. See id. ¶ 64.  
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consists of “testing the lawfulness of the law by breaking it”222 is 
not an effective one. In so doing, the ECJ duly takes into account 
cultural traditions as well as ethical values that underpin national 
rules of procedure.  
B. Simplification of the Legal Process 
An interesting question for national legislators is whether 
they can create specialized courts whose jurisdiction is limited to 
enforcing particular national laws. In other words, claims having 
the same form of action but directly based on EU law would be 
excluded from the purview of these specialized courts, and 
directed to ordinary courts. Additionally, actions partly based on 
national law and partly based on EU law would have to be split in 
order to have access to these specialized courts.  
In essence, this was the issue which the ECJ confronted in 
Impact, decided in 2008.223 There, the ECJ held that, insofar as 
dividing the action into two separate complaints would result in 
procedural disadvantages for individuals seeking to rely directly 
on EU law, the principle of effectiveness mandates specialized 
courts to expand their jurisdiction accordingly.224 This would be 
the case where the costs, the duration, and rules of 
 
222. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Unibet, [2007] E.C.R. I-2271, ¶ 44 
(echoing the argument previously advanced by Advocate General Jacobs in UPA, Case C-
50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶ 43, in the context of the judicial review of community 
measures). In UPA, Advocate General Jacobs criticized the case law of the ECJ under ex-
article 230 EC on the ground that Community regulations not requiring further 
national implementing measures would force applicants not having standing to breach 
Community law, exposing them to administrative sanctions, which they could then 
challenge. Advocate General Jacobs, consequently, urged the ECJ to adopt a more 
generous approach in defining “individual concern.” Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council (UPA), [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶ 59. 
Yet, the ECJ persisted in not departing from its previous case law, holding that this 
would require a treaty amendment, and noted that, in any event, it is for the national 
legislators to facilitate indirect challenges. See UPA, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶¶ 40–41. But 
see TFEU, supra note 3, art. 263, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 162–63; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 
230, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 146 (no longer requiring applicants to be “individually 
concerned” in relation to “[EU] regulatory act[s] which [are] of direct concern to them 
and [do] not entail implementing measures”). Arguably, in the light of Unibet, it seems 
that the ECJ is more demanding with national courts than it is with itself. See Anthony 
Arnull, Note on Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd. and Unibet (International) Ltd. v. 
Justitiekanslern, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1763, 1776 (2007) 
223. Impact v. Minister for Agric. & Food, Case C-268/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶ 
37. 
224. Id. ¶ 55. 
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representation rendered the exercise of EU rights excessively 
difficult.225 The ECJ did not decide whether the applicant was put 
in a disadvantaged position. This determination was left to the 
national court.226 
One could object that the Court intruded into the realm of 
national rules of procedure, since the applicant could have filed 
its complaint before an ordinary court in the first place. 
However, this argument is difficult to uphold in light of two 
procedural principles. First, as indicated by Advocate General 
Kokott,227 the allocation of certain claims to specialized courts 
ensures the efficient administration of justice. In light of their 
legal expertise, specialized courts are better equipped to provide 
parties with a faster and more accurate legal solution to the 
question brought before them than an ordinary court.228 
Secondly, the ruling of the ECJ is consistent with the principle of 
procedural economy. It aims to prevent applicants invoking EU 
rights from facing procedural complications and thus improves 
the procedural system as a whole. Not only would parallel 
litigation increase the costs of the applicant, but also those of the 
defendant. National courts would also waste precious time and 
resources by examining the same legal issues twice. Seen from 
this perspective, the ECJ and the referring national court 
cooperated in pursuing the same goal, namely ensuring the 
quality and speed of the administration of justice. 
C. Endorsing General Procedural Principles of National Law 
EU law does not require national courts to “abandon the 
passive role assigned to them in civil proceedings by going 
beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties 
themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than 
 
225. See id. ¶ 51. 
226. Id. ¶ 54. However, Advocate General Kokott went a step further, holding that 
the specialized court should exercise its jurisdiction over the claim directly based on EU 
law. She opined that any separation of jurisdiction would render a direct reliance on EU 
rights excessively difficult, weakening its direct effect. See Opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott, Impact, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶ 65. As for the principle of equivalence, she drew 
a comparison between actions filed before ordinary courts and actions lodged before 
specialized courts, concluding that the former were considerably more formal, complex, 
costly, and time-consuming than the latter. Id. Accordingly, applicants directly invoking 
EU law were in a worse position than those relying on national law. Id. ¶ 76. 
227. Id. ¶ 55. 
228. See Biondi, supra note 213, at 230. 
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those on which the party with an interest in application of [EU 
law] bases his claim.”229 Otherwise, the right of defense and the 
proper conduct of proceedings may be jeopardized. Yet, national 
courts must raise a point of EU law of their own motion when 
national law requires or authorizes them to do so,230 particularly 
when that point of EU law concerns public policy.231 In relation 
to consumer protection, EU law vests in national courts the 
procedural power to examine the unfair character of a 
jurisdictional clause or of any other contractual term of their own 
motion.232 
In Heemskerk233 delivered in 2008, a Dutch court asked the 
ECJ whether a national court should invoke EU law of its own 
motion in order to redress a violation of EU law, despite the fact 
that this would contravene the principle of Dutch law prohibiting 
reformatio in pejus by putting the individual bringing the action in 
a less favorable position than if he had not brought that action in 
the first place. 
Advocate General Bot answered this question in the 
affirmative. He pointed out that the principle of effectiveness, 
understood as the effective exercise of rights conferred by EU 
law, was not an appropriate reference for the case at issue.234 
Since no party would raise a plea contrary to its own interests and 
no administrative authority would be enthusiastic to admit it 
made a mistake, he urged the ECJ not to look at the “private 
interests of individuals,” but to examine whether the general 
interest at the EU level (the financial interests of the EU as well 
as animal welfare) was safeguarded.235 To this effect, the 
Advocate General considered that, as “the last line of defence for 
 
229. Van Schijndel v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases 
C-430–31/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-4705, ¶ 22. 
230. See id. ¶ 14. 
231. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] 
E.C.R. I-3055. 
232. See Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05, [2006] E.C.R. 
I-10,421; Cofidis v. Jean-Louis Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-10,875; Océano 
Grupo Editorial v. Murciano Quintero, Joined Cases C-240 & C-244/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
4941. For a more recent case, see Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, Case C-
243/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-4713. 
233. Heemskerk BV & Firma Schaap v. Productschap Vee en Vlees, Case C-455/06, 
[2008] E.C.R. I-8763. 
234. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 122. 
235. Id. ¶ 127. 
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correcting a misapplication of [EU] law by a competent national 
authority,”236 the referring court should mandate of its own 
motion the recovery of all sums already paid, even if this entails 
setting aside the principle of Dutch law prohibiting reformatio in 
pejus. 
The ECJ, however, took a different approach. It held that 
EU law does not require national courts to violate the 
prohibition of reformatio in pejus contained in national law. In its 
view, “[s]uch an obligation would be contrary not only to the 
principles of respect for the rights of the defence, legal certainty 
and protection of legitimate expectations . . . ,” but it would also 
put the applicant “in a less favorable position than he would have 
been in, had he not brought that action.”237  
Heemskerk thus demonstrates the ECJ’s serious commitment 
to respecting the principles enshrined in national rules of 
procedure. While the approach defended by the Advocate 
General would have encouraged national authorities to be more 
rigorous when exercising their discretion and would have 
prevented recipients from retaining unlawfully obtained funds,238 
the ECJ reckoned that these concerns were not pressing enough 
to depart from the principle of Dutch law prohibiting reformatio 
in pejus. The Court prioritizes the defense of the procedural 
rights of the parties over endorsing à tout prix effectiveness of the 
judicial enforcement of the general interest at EU level. This case 
also indicates that the ECJ is not so keen on limiting the 
principle of procedural autonomy where the applicant’s EU 
rights are not at risk. 
D. Preserving the Division of Jurisdiction between the ECJ and 
National Courts 
The principle of res judicata aims at reinforcing legal 
certainty by establishing that judicial proceedings at some stage 
become final. Not only has this principle been recognized by the 
ECJ in relation to judicial review of EU acts,239 but also as to 
 
236. Id. ¶¶ 128–29. 
237. Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 47. 
238. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 144. 
239. See Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal 
& Steel Cmty., Case 3/54, [1955] E.C.R., 63; Italy v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal & Steel 
Cmty., Case 2/54, [1954] E.C.R. 37, ¶ 55; France v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal & Steel 
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national judicial proceedings involving EU law.240 However, as 
recognized by the national systems themselves241 and by the 
European Court of Human Rights,242 this principle is not 
absolute. For instance, where a judicial decision blatantly violates 
fundamental rights, its final character cannot be upheld. By the 
same token, the principle of res judicata should not stand in the 
way of principles vital for the EU, such as the principle of 
primacy or conferred competence. Thus, in Lucchini,243 the ECJ 
was asked whether a Commission decision, declaring that state 
aid granted to an Italian company was unlawful, had to be given 
effect by Italian authorities despite a final decision of an Italian 
civil court to the contrary. Not having brought annulment 
proceedings against the Commission decision, the recipient of 
the aid sought to rely on the principle of res judicata in order to 
avoid recovery. In a succinct judgment, the ECJ held that EU law 
required national courts to comply with the Commission 
decision, even if this meant “refusing . . . to apply any conflicting 
provision of national legislation.”244 
The ruling of the ECJ in Lucchini has been criticized on the 
ground that it erodes the res judicata principle. Critics argued 
that regardless of whether one agrees or not with the argument 
that state liability for acts of the judiciary undermines the 
principle of res judicata, Köbler at least did not adversely affect the 
rights of private parties, whereas in Lucchini, the recipient of the 
aid was forced to reimburse it more than twelve years after the 
flawed judicial decision became final.245 The right avenue would 
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rather have been for the Commission to initiate infringement 
proceedings against Italy.246 
However, these arguments seem to play down the crux of 
the ECJ’s rationale. In addition to being a clear violation of EU 
law, the flawed judicial decision threatened the vertical allocation 
of powers between the EU and the Member States. In contrast to 
previous cases where the principle of res judicata was discussed, 
Lucchini involved the encroachment by a national court on an 
exclusive competence of the EU.247 Not only did the Italian court 
misinterpret the obligations EU law imposes on it, but it also 
exceeded its jurisdiction. Such upfront attack on the principle of 
primacy could not be tolerated, even if cloaked in the principle 
of national procedural autonomy.  
Indeed, no one will contest that the principle of primacy 
would be reduced to nothing if the principle of res judicata 
prevented a final decision issued by a national court, which 
declares void an EU act, from being set aside.248 The same 
constitutional damage is suffered by the EU legal order when a 
national court strips the Commission of its exclusive competence 
to declare state aid incompatible with the common market. 
Therefore, in order to protect the constitutional equilibrium, the 
ECJ had no other option but to intervene. 
Finally, suppose that the Commission decision had been 
unsuccessfully challenged by the recipient and that no appeal 
had been brought against the ruling of the EGC. There would 
then be two conflicting rulings, both final. Using a temporal 
criterion to award preclusive effect does not seem appropriate, 
especially if the earlier ruling is issued by a national court that 
lacks jurisdiction. Far from undermining the principle of res 
judicata, the ECJ is simply relying on the principle of primacy to 
avoid parallel EU and national litigation leading to jurisdictional 
conflicts. Thus, in Lucchini, the ECJ did not forever turn its back 
on the principle of res judicata. On the contrary, in so far as 
national courts operate within their jurisdiction, due account 
must be taken of this principle. 
 
246. See id. at 49. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are no enclaves of national sovereignty precluding EU 
law from displaying its pervasive effects. Instead, provided that 
there is a link with the substantive law of the Union, there is an 
EU framework that percolates through all areas of national law, 
limiting the discretion of national legislators and administrative 
authorities. Consequently, the latter must foresee possible links 
with EU law and draft national measures accordingly 
(alternatively, they may also decide to limit the application of a 
given measure to purely internal situations). 
Ultimately, it is therefore the existence (or absence) of this 
link that is decisive in the vertical allocation of powers. The area 
of law within which the conflict between national law and EU law 
arises does not really matter in this respect. As a corollary of this 
link, EU law leaves unaddressed reverse discrimination. For 
example, a German couple who has always resided in Germany 
may not use a double-barreled surname when naming their child. 
Traditionally, these situations are left to the national political 
process to tackle or are redirected to the judicial process where 
they would have to pass muster under the relevant national 
constitutional provisions. For example, it would be for the 
German legislator or for the German courts applying the 
German constitution to put an end to reverse discrimination. 
Furthermore, since Member States may justify restrictions 
prohibited in principle by the treaty provisions on free 
movement and EU citizenship by referring to reasons of general 
interest (as recognized by the EU), the degree of scrutiny 
employed by the ECJ in assessing their validity is also crucial in 
defining how much power is left to the Member States. 
In the absence of harmonization, pursuant to the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness, it is for national procedural 
rules to afford a sufficient level of judicial protection to EU 
rights. Recent case law demonstrates that the ECJ and national 
courts cooperate to improve the quality of litigation while not 
neglecting the protection of EU rights. In sum, the ECJ takes into 
account the principles enshrined in national rules of procedure. 
Finally, far from being immutable, the EU framework has 
shifting contours, and the pervasive effect of EU law must be 
assessed on a case by case basis. This is not surprising. As shown 
by the examples taken from the case law of the ECJ, the 
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application of the treaty provisions on free movement and EU 
citizenship as well as the application of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness often involve balancing colliding 
interests of equal constitutional ranking. The ECJ must perform 
this challenging task in a constructive dialogue with national 
courts. 
